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Abstract
We propose a distance measure between two probability distributions, which allows one to
bound the amount of belief change that occurs when moving from one distribution to another.
We contrast the proposed measure with some well known measures, including KL-divergence,
showing some theoretical properties on its ability to bound belief changes. We then present
two practical applications of the proposed distance measure: sensitivity analysis in belief net-
works and probabilistic belief revision. We show how the distance measure can be easily com-
puted in these applications, and then use it to bound global belief changes that result from
either the perturbation of local conditional beliefs or the accommodation of soft evidence.
Finally, we show that two well known techniques in sensitivity analysis and belief revision cor-
respond to the minimization of our proposed distance measure and, hence, can be shown to be
optimal from that viewpoint.
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1. Introduction
Wepropose in this paper a distancemeasure, which allows one to bound the amount
of belief change that results from transforming one probabilistic state of belief into an-
other. Speciﬁcally, given a probability distribution Pr representing an initial state of
belief, and a distribution Pr 0 representing a new state of belief, we deﬁne a distance
measure, which allows us to tightly bound belief change as follows: 1/k 6 O 0(ajb)/
O(ajb) 6 k. Here, k is a constant that depends on the proposed distance, a and b are
arbitrary events, O(ajb) is the odds of event a given b with respect to Pr, and O 0(ajb)
is the odds of event a given b with respect to Pr 0. We show a number of theoretical re-
sults about the proposed measure and then present two of its key applications.
On the theoretical side, we prove that our proposed measure satisﬁes the three
properties of distance. We also contrast our distance measure with classical meas-
ures, including KL-divergence [13] where we present some results on its ability to
bound belief changes. Speciﬁcally, we show that belief change between two states
of belief can be unbounded, even when their KL-divergence tends to zero. We show,
however, that KL-divergence can be used to bound the average change in beliefs as
opposed to the worst-case change in beliefs.
On the practical side, we present two main applications of our proposed distance
measure. The ﬁrst application is sensitivity analysis in belief networks, an area which
concerns itself with bounding global belief change that results from applying a local
perturbation to a belief network [14,1,4,3,12,2,16]. We show three key results here.
First, we show that if Pr is the distribution induced by a belief network N, and if
Pr 0 is the distribution induced by a belief network N 0 that results from changing
some conditional probability table (CPT) in N, then the distance between Pr and
Pr 0 can be computed locally by only examining the changed CPT. Second, we use
our distance measure to provide a bound on global belief change that results from
a local CPT change, and show that our bound generalizes and provides more insights
into the bound given by Chan and Darwiche recently [2]. Finally, we use our pro-
posed distance measure to prove the optimality of a prevalent, but formally unjusti-
ﬁed, technique in the literature on sensitivity analysis relating to changing the CPTs
of multivalued variables [14,12,4].
The second application we consider for our distance measure is in belief revision
[6]. Here, we show how our distance measure can be used to bound belief change that
results from incorporating uncertain evidence according to both Jeﬀreys rule [9] and
Pearls method of virtual evidence [15]. We actually prove the optimality of Jeﬀreys
rule with regards to minimizing belief change and, ﬁnally, consider the application of
our distance measure to quantifying the strength of evidence, as measured by the
amount of belief change it induces.
Proofs of all theorems in this paper can be found in Appendix A.
2. A probabilistic distance measure
Our proposed measure is deﬁned between two probability distributions.
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Deﬁnition 2.1. Let Pr and Pr 0 be two probability distributions over the same set of
worlds w. We deﬁne a measure D(Pr,Pr 0) as follows:
DðPr; Pr0Þ ¼def lnmax
w
Pr0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ  lnminw
Pr0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ ;
where we will deﬁne, 0=0 ¼def 1 and 1=1¼def 1 in this paper.
We will say that two probability distributions Pr and Pr 0 have the same support, if
for every world w, Pr(w) = 0 iﬀ Pr 0(w) = 0. Note that if two distributions Pr and Pr 0
do not have the same support, D(Pr,Pr 0) =1.
Our ﬁrst result on the deﬁned measure is that it satisﬁes the three properties of
distance, hence, it is a distance measure.
Theorem 2.1. Let Pr, Pr 0 and Pr00 be three probability distributions over the same set
of worlds. The distance measure given in Definition 2.1 satisfies these three properties:
Positiveness: D(Pr,Pr 0)P0, and D(Pr,Pr 0) = 0 iff Pr = Pr 0;
Symmetry: D(Pr,Pr 0) = D(Pr 0,Pr);
Triangle Inequality: D(Pr,Pr 0) + D(Pr 0,Pr00)P D(Pr,Pr00).
The interest in the deﬁned distance measure stems from two reasons. First, it can
be easily computed in a number of practical situations which we discuss in later sec-
tions. Second, it allows us to bound the diﬀerence in beliefs captured by two prob-
ability distributions.
Theorem 2.2. Let Pr and Pr 0 be two probability distributions over the same set of
worlds. Let a and b be two events. We then have
eDðPr;Pr
0Þ 6 O
0ðajbÞ
OðajbÞ 6 e
DðPr;Pr0Þ;
where OðajbÞ ¼ PrðajbÞ=PrðajbÞ is the odds of event a given b with respect to Pr, and
O0ðajbÞ ¼ Pr0ðajbÞ=Pr0ðajbÞ is the odds of event a given b with respect to Pr 0. 1 The
bound is tight in the sense that for every pair of distributions Pr and Pr 0, there are
events a and b such that:
O0ðajbÞ
OðajbÞ ¼ e
DðPr;Pr0Þ;
O0ðajbÞ
OðajbÞ ¼ e
DðPr;Pr0Þ:
We can express the bound of Theorem 2.2 in two other useful forms. First, we can
use logarithms
j lnO0ðajbÞ  lnOðajbÞj 6 DðPr; Pr0Þ: ð1Þ
1 Of course, we must have Pr(b)5 0 and Pr 0(b)5 0 for the odds to be deﬁned.
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Second, we can use probabilities instead of odds
ped
pðed  1Þ þ 1 6 Pr
0ðajbÞ 6 pe
d
pðed  1Þ þ 1 ; ð2Þ
where p = Pr(ajb) is the initial belief in a given b, and d = D(Pr,Pr 0) is the distance.
The bounds of Pr 0(ajb) are plotted against p for several diﬀerent values of d in Fig. 1.
In the applications we shall discuss next, Pr is a distribution which represents
some initial state of belief, and Pr 0 is a distribution which represents a new state
of belief. The new state of belief results form applying some kind of local change
to the initial state. Examples include the change in some conditional belief or the
incorporation of new evidence. Our goal is then to assess the global impact of such
local belief changes. According to Theorem 2.2, if we are able to compute the dis-
tance measure D(Pr,Pr 0), then we can bound global belief change in a very precise
sense. For example, we can use Inequality 2 to compute the bound on any query
Pr 0(ajb). We will later show two applications from sensitivity analysis and belief revi-
sion where the distance measure can be computed eﬃciently.
3. Comparisons with existing measures
Before we discuss the applications of our proposed distance measure, we ﬁrst need
to settle a major question: can we bound belief change in the sense given above using
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Fig. 1. The bounds of Pr 0(ajb), as given by Inequality 2, plotted against the initial belief p = Pr(ajb) for
several diﬀerent values of distance d = D(Pr,Pr 0): d = .1 (top left), d = 1 (top right), d = 2 (bottom left), and
d = 3 (bottom right).
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one of the classical probabilistic measures? We show next that this is not possible
using at least two of the most commonly used measures: KL-divergence and Eucli-
dean distance. We show, however, that KL-divergence can be used to provide an
average-case bound on belief changes and we also provide a relationship between
that bound and ours.
We start ﬁrst with Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence, which is one of the most
common measures for comparing probability distributions [13].
Deﬁnition 3.1. Let Pr and Pr 0 be two probability distributions over the same set of
worlds w. The KL-divergence between Pr and Pr 0 is deﬁned as
KLðPr; Pr0Þ ¼def
X
w
PrðwÞ ln Pr
0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ :
The ﬁrst thing to note about KL-divergence 2 is that it is incomparable with our
distance measure.
Example 3.1. Consider the following distributions, Pr, Pr 0 and Pr00, over worlds w1,
w2 and w3
Prðw1Þ ¼ :50; Prðw2Þ ¼ :25; Prðw3Þ ¼ :25;
Pr0ðw1Þ ¼ :50; Pr0ðw2Þ ¼ :30; Pr0ðw3Þ ¼ :20;
Pr00ðw1Þ ¼ :43; Pr00ðw2Þ ¼ :32; Pr00ðw3Þ ¼ :25:
Computing the KL-divergence and our distance measure gives us
KLðPr; Pr0Þ ¼ :0102; KLðPr; Pr00Þ ¼ :0137;
DðPr; Pr0Þ ¼ :405; DðPr; Pr00Þ ¼ :398:
Therefore, according to KL-divergence, Pr 0 is closer to Pr than Pr00, while accord-
ing to our distance measure, Pr00 is closer to Pr than Pr 0.
The next example shows that we can make the KL-divergence arbitrarily close to
0, while keeping some odds ratio arbitrarily close to some constant k. Hence, KL-
divergence cannot be used to bound belief changes as permitted by our proposed
measure.
Example 3.2. Consider the following distributions, Pr and Pr 0, over worlds w1, w2
and w3:
Prðw1Þ ¼ p; Prðw2Þ ¼ q p; Prðw3Þ ¼ 1 q;
Pr0ðw1Þ ¼ kp; Pr0ðw2Þ ¼ q kp; Pr0ðw3Þ ¼ 1 q;
2 Note that KL-divergence is asymmetric, and is thus technically not a distance measure.
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where p, q and k are constants, with 0 6 p 6 q 6 1 and 0 6 k 6 q/p. The KL-diver-
gence between Pr and Pr 0 is
KLðPr; Pr0Þ ¼ p ln k  ðq pÞ ln q kp
q p :
Assume we have events a = w1 and b = w1,w2. The odds ratio of a given b between
Pr and Pr 0 is
O0ðajbÞ
OðajbÞ ¼
kðq pÞ
q kp :
We can see that as p approaches 0, the KL-divergence also approaches 0, while the
odds ratio O 0(ajb)/O(ajb) approaches k.
This example shows that we can make the KL-divergence arbitrarily close to 0,
while keeping some odds ratio arbitrarily close to some constant k. In this example,
we condition on event b, which has a probability of q that can be arbitrarily large.
However, the probability of a, which is p according to Pr and kp according to Pr 0,
is very small. Hence, although we have Pr 0(a)/Pr(a) = k, this ratio is ignored by KL-
divergence because the term p lnk is very small as p approaches 0. More generally,
the ‘‘contribution’’ of a world w to KL-divergence is equal to Pr(w) ln(Pr 0(w)/
Pr(w)). Therefore for a ﬁxed ratio Pr 0(w)/Pr(w), this ‘‘contribution’’ becomes closer
to 0 as Pr(w) decreases, and becomes inﬁnitesimal when Pr(w) approaches 0.
Another popular measure to compare two probability distributions is the Eucli-
dean distance.
Deﬁnition 3.2. Let Pr and Pr 0 be two probability distributions over the same set of
worlds w. The Euclidean distance between Pr and Pr 0 is deﬁned as:
EDðPr; Pr0Þ ¼def
X
w
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðPr0ðwÞ  PrðwÞÞ2
q
:
That is, when computing the Euclidean distance, we add up the squared diﬀer-
ences between pairs of probability values. Therefore, this measure has the same
problem as KL-divergence: even if there is a large relative diﬀerence for the proba-
bility of a world with respect to Pr and Pr 0, it will be ignored if this probability is
very small. Consequently, we cannot provide any guarantee on the ratio O 0(ajb)/
O(ajb), no matter how small the Euclidean distance is (unless it is zero).
To summarize, neither KL-divergence nor Euclidean distance can be used to pro-
vide guarantees on the ratio O 0(ajb)/O(ajb), as we did in Theorem 2.2 using our dis-
tance measure.
Finally, we note that our distance measure is an improvement over computing the
L-inﬁnity metric L1ðln Pr; ln Pr0Þ ¼def maxwj ln Pr0ðwÞ  ln PrðwÞj, because our distance
measure is computed from both the maximum and minimum values of
lnPr 0(w)  lnPr(w). If L1(lnPr, lnPr 0) = x, we can conclude that x 6 lnPr 0(w) 
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lnPr(w) 6 x for any w, and prove the following two guarantees. First, if a and b are
two events, we have e2x 6 O 0(ajb)/O(ajb) 6 e2x. Second, our distance measure is
bounded such that D(Pr,Pr 0) 6 2x. However, the ﬁrst guarantee is also a direct
result of the second guarantee, and by computing the exact value of the distance
measure D(Pr,Pr 0), we can obtain a bound that is no worse than the bound obtained
from L1(lnPr, lnPr 0). Therefore, our distance measure should always be preferred.
3.1. KL-divergence as an average-case bound
Even though KL-divergence cannot be used to bound belief changes as discussed
above, it can still be used to oﬀer a bound but on the average change in beliefs. This
is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Let Pr and Pr 0 be two probability distributions over the same set of
worlds. Let a and b be two events. We then have
KLðPr; Pr0ÞP PrðbÞ PrðajbÞ ln Pr
0ðajbÞ
PrðajbÞ þ ð1 PrðajbÞÞ ln
1 Pr0ðajbÞ
1 PrðajbÞ
 
;
or alternatively, in odds
KLðPr; Pr0ÞP PrðbÞ lnO
0ðajbÞ þ 1
OðajbÞ þ 1 
OðajbÞ
OðajbÞ þ 1 ln
O0ðajbÞ
OðajbÞ
 
;
where OðajbÞ ¼ PrðajbÞ=PrðajbÞ is the odds of event a given b with respect to Pr, and
O0ðajbÞ ¼ Pr0ðajbÞ=Pr0ðajbÞ is the odds of event a given b with respect to Pr 0.
According to this theorem, the KL-divergence can be used to provide a guarantee
on the new odds value O 0(ajb) in terms of the original odds value O(ajb). However,
the provided guarantee depends on the probability of event b, where the quality of
the guarantee degrades as the probability decreases. This echoes Example 3.2, where
we can get a constant log-odds change even when the KL-divergence approaches 0,
because the probability Pr(b) also approaches 0. To give better insights into the
guarantee oﬀered by Theorem 3.1, we plot in Fig. 2 the bounds it provides for dif-
ferent values of KL(Pr,Pr 0) and Pr(b).
One can also provide a bound on the change in odds of ajb which is independent
of the probability of b by taking an average over all possible probabilities of b, but
that would be an average-case bound as opposed to the worst-case bound provided
by our measure.
3.2. Bayes factor
One useful term that can help us further understand our distance measure and its
relation to KL-divergence is the Bayes factor [7,8,10], deﬁned as follows.
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Deﬁnition 3.3. If Pr and Pr 0 are two probability distributions, and a and b are two
events, the Bayes factor (or odds factor), FPr0,Pr(a:b), is deﬁned as the ratio of new-
to-old odds
F Pr0 ;Prða : bÞ ¼def Pr
0ðaÞ=Pr0ðbÞ
PrðaÞ=PrðbÞ :
Our distance measure given in Deﬁnition 2.1 can be expressed using the Bayes
factor
DðPr; Pr0Þ ¼ lnmax
wi ;wj
F Pr0 ;Prðwi : wjÞ:
Therefore, our distance measure can be regarded as the logarithm of the maxi-
mum Bayes factor of any two worlds between the two distributions. Consequently,
it can be used to bound the Bayes factor of any two events between the two
distributions.
Theorem 3.2. Let Pr and Pr 0 be two probability distributions over the same set of
worlds. Let c1 and c2 be two events. We then have
eDðPr;Pr
0Þ 6 F Pr0;Prðc1 : c2Þ 6 eDðPr;Pr
0Þ:
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Fig. 2. The bounds of Pr 0(ajb), as given by Theorem 3.1, plotted against the initial belief p = Pr(ajb), for
diﬀerent values of KL(Pr,Pr 0) and Pr(b):KL(Pr,Pr 0) = .005 and Pr(b) = 1 (top left), KL(Pr,Pr 0) = .02 and
Pr(b) = 1 (top right), KL(Pr,Pr 0) = .005 and Pr(b) = .1 (bottom left), and KL(Pr,Pr 0) = .02 and Pr(b) = .1
(bottom right).
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Theorem 2.2 is a special case of Theorem 3.2, when we substitute the following
terms: c1 = ajb and c2 ¼ ajb.
While our distance measure provides us a worst-case bound of Bayes factors, the
KL-divergence can be perceived as an average-case bound of Bayes factors, as shown
by the next theorem.
Theorem 3.3. If a is an arbitrary event, and c1, . . . , cn is a set of mutually exclusive
and exhaustive events, we then have:
0 6
X
i
PrðciÞ ln F Pr0 ;Prða : ciÞ  ln
Pr0ðaÞ
PrðaÞ 6 KLðPr; Pr
0Þ:
If instead of an arbitrary partition c1, . . . , cn, we are given the set of worlds w, then
we will get the following equality relation
KLðPr; Pr0Þ ¼
X
w
PrðwÞ ln F Pr0 ;Prða : wÞ  ln Pr
0ðaÞ
PrðaÞ :
Theorem 3.3 gives us a bound on the weighted sum of the logarithms of the Bayes
factors using KL-divergence.
To further relate the two bounds, we ask an interesting question: If we are given
the value of our distance measure between two distributions, can we put a bound on
the KL-divergence between them? The following theorem provides us the answer.
Theorem 3.4. Given two distributions Pr and Pr 0, where D(Pr,Pr 0) = d > 0, we have
KLðPr; Pr0Þ 6 1 ln d
ed  1þ
d
ed  1 :
The plot of the bound of Theorem 3.4 against d is shown in Fig. 3. Hence, the
smaller d is, the more we can say about the KL-divergence as we can get a tighter
bound. If we view our distance measure as providing a worst-case bound on belief
changes, and KL-divergence as providing an average-case bound on such changes,
it is then not surprising that we can say more about the average-case bound (KL-
divergence) as the worst-case bound (our distance measure) is less dramatic.
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Fig. 3. The bound of KL-divergence KL(Pr,Pr0) as a function of the distance measure d = D(Pr,Pr 0), as
given in Theorem 3.4.
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We close this section with some further comments on the suitability of the aver-
age-case versus worst-case bounds:
(1) Average-case bounds have proved to be useful in learning algorithms, while
worst-case bounds are more important in common-sense reasoning, where con-
ditioning on unlikely events is not uncommon.
(2) Even in learning algorithms, worst-case analysis can be useful if it gives us tight
results.
4. Applications to sensitivity analysis
We now consider a major application of our distance measure to sensitivity anal-
ysis in belief networks [14,1,12,4,2]. A belief network is a graphical probabilistic
model, composed of two parts: a directed acyclic graph where nodes represent var-
iables, and a set of conditional probability tables (CPTs), one for each variable
[15,11]. The CPT for variable X with parents U deﬁnes a set of conditional beliefs
of the form hxju = Pr(xju), where x is a value of variable X, u is an instantiation of
parents U, and hxju is the probability value of x given u, and is called a network
parameter.
One of the key questions with respect to belief networks is this: what can we say
about the global eﬀect of changing some parameter hxju to a new value h
0
xju? That is,
what is the eﬀect of such a local parameter change on the value of some arbitrary
query Pr(ajb)?
Our earlier results [2] have provided a partial answer to this question, for the case
where: variable X is binary (it has only two values, x and x); a is the value y of some
variable Y; b is the instantiation e of some variables E, and neither hxju nor h
0
xju
is extreme (equal to 0 or 1). Speciﬁcally under these conditions, we have shown
that
j lnO0ðyjeÞ  lnOðyjeÞj 6 ln h
0
xju
h0xju
 ln hxju
hxju

: ð3Þ
Using the above bound, we provided a formalization of a number of intuitions
relating to the sensitivity of probabilistic queries to changes in network parameters.
We will now show how our distance measure can be used to derive a generalization
of the above bound, which applies without any of the previously mentioned
restrictions.
Suppose that our initial belief network is N and it induces a probability distribu-
tion Pr. By changing the CPT for variable X, we produce a new belief network N 0
that induces a probability distribution Pr 0. If we are able to compute the distance
between Pr and Pr 0, D(Pr,Pr 0), we can then use Theorem 2.2 to provide a guarantee
on the global eﬀect of the local CPT change. As it turns out, the distance can be com-
puted locally as given by the following theorem.
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Theorem 4.1. Let N and N 0 be belief networks which induce distributions Pr and Pr 0
respectively, and let X be a variable with parents U in network N. Suppose that N 0 is
obtained from N by changing the conditional probability distribution of variable X given
parent instantiation u from HXju to H0X ju, i.e. we change parameter hxju to h
0
xju for every
value x. If Pr(u) > 0, then:
DðPr; Pr0Þ ¼ DðHX ju;H0X juÞ:
The above theorem shows that the distance between the global probability distri-
butions induced by networks N and N 0 is exactly the distance between the local dis-
tributions of X given u, assuming that all other local distributions in N and N 0 are the
same.
Theorem 4.1 is of great practical importance as it allows us to invoke Theorem 2.2
to provide a generalized sensitivity analysis formula for belief networks.
Corollary 4.1. Let N and N 0 be belief networks which induce distributions Pr and Pr 0
respectively, and let X be a variable with parents U in network N. Suppose that N 0 is
obtained from N by changing the conditional probability distribution of variable X given
parent instantiation u from HXj u to H0X ju, i.e. we change parameter hxju to h
0
xju for every
value x. If Pr(u) > 0, then
e
DðHX ju;H0X juÞ 6 O
0ðajbÞ
OðajbÞ 6 e
DðHX ju;H0X juÞ:
The bound given by Inequality 3 is a special case of Corollary 4.1, when X has
only two values x and x. In this case, the distance DðHX ju;H0X juÞ is equal to
DðHX ju;H0X juÞ ¼ ln
h0xju
hxju
 ln h
0
xju
hxju

 ¼ ln
h0xju
h0xju
 ln hxju
hxju

:
We have therefore generalized their results on sensitivity analysis to arbitrary
events and belief networks. We have also relaxed the condition that neither hxju
nor h0xju can be extreme.
4.1. Comparison with KL-divergence
Suppose now that we want to compute the KL-divergence between two belief net-
works under the same circumstances. We have
KLðPr; Pr0Þ ¼ PrðuÞKLðHX ju;H0X juÞ:
We can see that to compute the KL-divergence between two beliefs networks due
to a single parameter change, we need to know the probability Pr(u). Hence, the KL-
divergence cannot be obtained locally as it would require a global computation to
obtain Pr(u). This is not necessary when we compute our distance measure as given
in Theorem 4.1. Hence, we have two diﬀerences between our distance measure and
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KL-divergence in this regard. One is semantical in which our measure can be used to
bound worst-case belief changes, while KL-divergence can be used to bound aver-
age-case belief changes. The second diﬀerence is computational where our measure
can be computed in constant time under local changes, while the KL-divergence
cannot.
4.2. Changing parameters of multi–valued variables
We now close this section with a ﬁnal application of our distance measure. Sup-
pose X is a variable with parents U, values x1,x2 and x3, and parameters hx1ju = .6,
hx2ju = .3 and hx3ju = .1. Suppose further that we want to change the parameter
hx1ju = .6 to h
0
x1ju ¼ :8. As a result, we will need to change the other parameters hx2ju
and hx3ju so that the sum of all three parameters remains to be 1. Because X is multi-
valued, there are inﬁnitely many ways to change the other two parameters and the
question is: which one of them should we choose? One popular scheme, which we
will call the proportional scheme, distributes the mass 1 h0x1ju ¼ 1 :8 ¼ :2 among
the other two parameters proportionally to their initial values. That is, the new
parameters will be h0x2ju ¼ :2ð:3=:4Þ ¼ :15 and h0x3ju ¼ :2ð:1=:4Þ ¼ :05. This scheme
has been used in all approaches to sensitivity analysis we are familiar with
[14,12,4], yet without justiﬁcation. As it turns out, we can use our distance measure
to prove the optimality of this scheme in a very precise sense.
Theorem 4.2. When changing a parameter hxju to h
0
xju for a multivalued variable X, the
proportional scheme, i.e. the one that sets h0xiju ¼ ð1 h0xjuÞðhxiju=ð1 hxjuÞÞ for all
xi5 x, leads to the smallest distance between the original and new distributions of X,
which is given by
DðHX ju;H0X juÞ ¼ ln
h0xju
hxju
 ln h
0
xju
hxju

 ¼ ln
h0xju
h0xju
 ln hxju
hxju

;
where we define h0xju ¼ 1 h0xju and hxju ¼ 1 hxju.
Theorem 4.2 thus justiﬁes the use of the proportional scheme on the grounds that
it leads to the tightest bound on the amount of associated belief change.
5. Applications to belief revision
The problem of probabilistic belief revision can be deﬁned as follows. We are
given a probability distribution Pr, which captures a state of belief and assigns a
probability p to some event c. We then obtain evidence suggesting a probability of
q5 p for c. Our goal is to change the distribution Pr to a new distribution Pr 0 such
that Pr 0(c) = q. There are two problems here. First, usually there are many choices
for Pr 0. Which one should we adopt? Second, if we decide to choose the new state
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of belief Pr 0 according to some speciﬁc method, can we provide any guarantee on
the amount of belief change that will be undergone as a result of moving from Pr
to Pr 0?
As for the ﬁrst question, we will consider two methods for updating a probabil-
ity distribution in the face of new evidence: Jeﬀreys rule [9] and Pearls method
of virtual evidence [15]. As for the second question, we will show next that we
can indeed provide interesting guarantees on the amount of belief change induced
by both methods. We present the guarantees ﬁrst and then some of their
applications.
5.1. Jeﬀreys rule
We start with Jeﬀreys rule for accommodating uncertain evidence.
Deﬁnition 5.1. Let Pr be a probability distribution over worlds w, and let c1, . . . , cn
be a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events that are assigned probabilities
p1, . . . , pn, respectively, by Pr. Suppose we want to change Pr to a new distribution
Pr 0 such that the probabilities of c1, . . . , cn become q1, . . . , qn, respectively. Jeffreys
rule deﬁnes the new distribution Pr 0 as follows:
Pr0ðwÞ ¼def PrðwÞ qi
pi
; if w  ci:
The main result we have about Jeﬀreys rule is that the distance between proba-
bility distributions Pr and Pr 0 can be computed directly from the old and new prob-
abilities of c1, . . . , cn. This immediately allows us to invoke Theorem 2.2 as we show
next.
Theorem 5.1. Let Pr and Pr 0 be two distributions, where Pr 0 is obtained by applying
Jeffreys rule to Pr as given in Definition 5.1. We then have
DðPr; Pr0Þ ¼ lnmax
i
qi
pi
 lnmin
i
qi
pi
:
We immediately get the following bound.
Corollary 5.1. If O and O 0 are the odds functions before and after applying Jeffreys
rule as given in Definition 5.1, then
ed 6 O
0ðajbÞ
OðajbÞ 6 e
d ;
where d = lnmaxi (qi/pi)  lnmini (qi/pi).
To consider an example application of Corollary 5.1, we use a simple example
from Jeﬀrey [9].
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Example 5.1. Assume that we are given a piece of cloth, where its color can be one
of: green (cg), blue (cb), or violet (cv). We also want to know whether in the next day,
the cloth will be sold (s), or not sold (s). Our original state of belief is given by the
probability distribution of the worlds Pr:
Prðs; cgÞ ¼ :12; Prðs; cbÞ ¼ :12; Prðs; cvÞ ¼ :32;
Prðs; cgÞ ¼ :18; Prðs; cbÞ ¼ :18; Prðs; cvÞ ¼ :08:
Therefore, our original state of belief on the color of the cloth (cg,cb,cv) is given
by the distribution (.3, .3, .4). Assume that we now inspect the cloth by candlelight,
and we want to revise our state of belief on the color of the cloth to the new distri-
bution (.7, .25, .05) using Jeffreys rule. The distance between the original and new
distributions of the worlds can be computed by simply examining the original and
new distributions on the color variable as given by Theorem 5.1. Speciﬁcally, the dis-
tance between the two distributions is ln(.7/.3)  ln(.05/.4) = 2.93. We can now use
this distance to provide a bound on the change in any of our beliefs. Consider for
example our belief that the cloth is green given that it is sold tomorrow, Pr(cgjs),
which is initially .214. Suppose we want to ﬁnd the bound on the change in this belief
induced by the new evidence. Given Corollary 5.1 and Inequality 2, we have:
:0144 6 Pr0ðcgjsÞ 6 :836;
which suggests that a dramatic change in belief is possible in this case. If we actually
apply Jeﬀreys rule, we get the new distribution Pr 0
Pr0ðs; cgÞ ¼ :28; Pr0ðs; cbÞ ¼ :10; Pr0ðs; cvÞ ¼ :04;
Pr0ðs; cgÞ ¼ :42; Pr0ðs; cbÞ ¼ :15; Pr0ðs; cvÞ ¼ :01;
according to which Pr 0(cgjs) = .667, which does suggest a dramatic change. On the
other hand, if the new evidence on the color of the cloth is given by the distribution
(.25, .25, .50) instead, the distance between the old and new distributions will be .406,
and our bound will be: .153 6 Pr 0(cgjs) 6 .290, which is obviously much tighter as
this evidence is much weaker.
Alternatively, we can compute the KL-divergence after applying Jeﬀreys rule:
KLðPr; Pr0Þ ¼
X
i
pi ln
qi
pi
:
Hence for Jeﬀreys rule, one can obtain locally both the average-case bounds and
the worst-case bounds on the amount of belief change.
We close this section by showing that Jeﬀreys rule commits to a probability dis-
tribution which minimizes our distance measure. Hence, Jeﬀreys rule leads to the
strongest bound on the amount of belief change. 3
3 It has been previously proven that the probability distribution obtained by Jeﬀreys rule also
minimizes the KL-divergence [5]. Hence, our result strengthens this previously known result as it shows
that Jeﬀerys rule lead to the strongest worst-case and average-case bounds on belief changes.
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Theorem 5.2. The new distribution Pr 0 obtained by applying Jeffreys rule to an initial
distribution Pr is optimal in the following sense. Among all possible distributions that
assign probabilities q1, . . . , qn to events c1, . . . , cn, Pr 0 minimizes the distance from Pr,
according to the measure defined in Definition 2.1. 4
5.2. Pearl’s method of virtual evidence
We now consider Pearls method of virtual evidence. According to this method,
we also have a new evidence g that bears on a set of mutually exclusive and exhaus-
tive events c1, . . . , cn, but the evidence is not speciﬁed as a set of new probabilities for
these events. Instead, for each ci, i5 1, we are given a number ki which is interpreted
as the ratio Pr(gjci)/Pr(gjc1). That is, ki represents the likelihood ratio that we would
obtain evidence g given ci, compared with given c1. Note that under this interpreta-
tion, we must have k1 = 1.
Deﬁnition 5.2. Let Pr be a probability distribution over worlds w, and let c1, . . . , cn
be a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events that are assigned probabilities
p1, . . . , pn, respectively, by Pr. Suppose we want to change Pr to a new distribution
Pr 0 to incorporate virtual evidence g, speciﬁed by k1, . . . , kn, with k1 = 1 and
ki = Pr(gjci)/Pr(gjc1) if i5 1. Pearls method of virtual evidence deﬁnes the new
distribution Pr 0 as follows:
Pr0ðwÞ ¼def PrðwÞ kiP
j
pjkj
; if w  ci:
Again, we can easily compute the distance between distributions Pr and Pr 0 using
only local information.
Theorem 5.3. Let Pr and Pr 0 be two distributions, where Pr 0 is obtained from Pr by
accommodating virtual evidence as given by Definition 5.2. We then have
DðPr; Pr0Þ ¼ lnmax
i
ki  lnmin
i
ki:
This immediately gives us the following bound.
Corollary 5.2. If O and O 0 are the odds functions before and after applying Pearl’s
method as given in Definition 5.2, then
ed 6 O
0ðajbÞ
OðajbÞ 6 e
d ;
where d = lnmaxiki  lnminiki.
4 Note that this distribution Pr 0 is not necessarily unique.
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For the special case where our evidence g bears only on qc versus c, with
k = Pr(gjc)/Pr(gjqc), the above bound reduces to jlnO 0(ajb)  lnO(a jb)j 6 jlnkj.
Therefore, the bound is tighter when k is closer to 1. Clearly, when k = 1, the evi-
dence is trivial and the two distributions are the same.
Alternatively, we can compute the KL-divergence due to applying virtual evidence
KLðPr; Pr0Þ ¼
X
i
pi ln
kiP
j
pjkj
:
Note, however, that to compute the KL-divergence, we need to know pi = Pr(ci),
which is not available locally from simply examining the virtual evidence. Hence,
although we can use KL-divergence to oﬀer average-case bounds on belief changes
induced by the method of virtual evidence, we cannot do this in constant time as
is possible using our proposed distance measure.
Consider the following example from Pearl [15].
Example 5.2. On any given day, there is a burglary on any given house with
probability Pr(b) = 104, while the alarm of Mr. Holmes house will go off if there is
a burglary with probability Pr(ajb) = .95, and go off if there is no burglary with
probability PrðajbÞ ¼ :01. One day, Mr. Holmes receives a call from his neighbor,
Mrs. Gibbons, saying she may have heard the alarm of his house going off. Mr.
Holmes concludes that there is an 80% chance that Mrs. Gibbons did hear the alarm
going off. According to Pearls method, this evidence can be interpreted as:
k ¼ PrðgjaÞ=PrðgjaÞ ¼ 4. Therefore, the distance between the original distribution Pr,
and the new distribution Pr 0 which results from incorporating the virtual evidence, is
jlnkj = jln4j = 1.386. We can use this distance to bound the change in any of our
beliefs. In particular, we may want to bound the new probability that there was a
burglary at Mr. Holmes house. Inequality 2 gives us
2:50 105 6 Pr0ðbÞ 6 4:00 104:
If we actually apply Pearls method, we get Pr 0(b) = 3.85 · 104.
Our distance measure is then useful for approximate reasoning given soft evidence,
as we can use the bound to approximate the probability of any event after the
accommodation of such evidence. The approximation itself takes constant time to
compute since we only need to compute the distance measure and apply Inequality
2. We stress, however, that the bound becomes trivial in the case of hard evidence
since the initial and new distributions no longer have the same support in this case,
making the distance between them inﬁnitely large.
We close this section by a ﬁnal application of our distance measure, relating to the
notion of evidence strength.
Example 5.3. Going back to Example 5.1, we ask: What kind of evidence will assure
us that our belief in the cloth being green given that it is sold tomorrow, which is now
at .214, would not exceed .3? Inequality 2 can be used in this case to obtain a
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suﬃcient condition on the strength of evidence which will ensure this. Speciﬁcally,
Inequality 2 gives us
:214ed
:214ðed  1Þ þ 1 6 Pr
0ðcgjsÞ 6 :214e
d
:214ðed  1Þ þ 1 :
To ensure that Pr 0(cgjs) 6 .3, we must ﬁnd a distance d that equates the above
upper bound to .3. A value of d = .454 has this property. Hence, any piece of
evidence which has a distance of no more than .454 from the current distribution on
color, (.3, .3, .4), would guarantee that Pr 0(cgjs) does not exceed .3. Following are
some pieces of evidence which satisfy this condition: (.25, .25, .5), (.25, .3, .45) and
(.35, .3, .35).
6. Conclusion
We proposed a distance measure between two probability distributions, which al-
lows one to bound the amount of belief change that occurs when moving from one
distribution to the other. We also contrasted the proposed measure with some well
known measures, including KL-divergence. We then presented two practical applica-
tions of the proposed distance measure: sensitivity analysis in belief networks and
probabilistic belief revision. We showed how the distance measure can be easily com-
puted in these applications, and then used it to bound global belief changes that re-
sult from either the perturbation of local conditional beliefs or the accommodation
of soft evidence. Finally, we showed that two well known techniques in sensitivity
analysis and belief revision correspond to the minimization of our proposed distance
measure and, hence, can be shown to be optimal from that viewpoint.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.1. The distance measure given in Deﬁnition 2.1 satisﬁes these
three properties:
Positiveness: Obviously, we have D(Pr,Pr 0)P 0 and D(Pr,Pr) = 0. We can easily
see that maxw (Pr
0(w)/Pr(w))P 1 and minw(Pr 0(w)/Pr(w)) 6 1, since
P
wPr
0ðwÞ ¼P
wPrðwÞ ¼ 1. When D(Pr,Pr 0) = 0, we must have maxw(Pr 0(w)/Pr(w)) = minw
(Pr 0(w)/Pr(w)) = 1. Therefore, Pr(w) = Pr 0(w) for all w, and thus Pr = Pr 0.
Symmetry: Since maxw(Pr
0(w)/Pr(w)) = minw(Pr(w)/Pr 0(w)) and minw(Pr 0(w)/
Pr(w)) = maxw(Pr(w)/Pr
0(w)), we can easily see that D(Pr,Pr 0) = D(Pr 0,Pr).
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Triangle inequality: Let Pr00(wi)/Pr(wi) = maxw(Pr00(w)/Pr(w)) and Pr00(wj)/
Pr(wj) = minw(Pr
00(w)/Pr(w)). Since ln(Pr00(wi)/Pr(wi)) = ln(Pr00(wi)/Pr 0(wi))  ln(Pr 0
(wi)/Pr(wi)), we have
DðPr; Pr00Þ ¼ lnmax
w
Pr00ðwÞ
PrðwÞ  lnminw
Pr00ðwÞ
PrðwÞ ¼ ln
Pr00ðwiÞ
PrðwiÞ  ln
Pr00ðwjÞ
PrðwjÞ
¼ ln Pr
00ðwiÞ
Pr0ðwiÞ  ln
Pr0ðwiÞ
PrðwiÞ
 
 ln Pr
00ðwjÞ
Pr0ðwjÞ  ln
Pr0ðwjÞ
PrðwjÞ
 
¼ ln Pr
0ðwjÞ
PrðwjÞ  ln
Pr0ðwiÞ
PrðwiÞ
 
þ ln Pr
00ðwiÞ
Pr0ðwiÞ  ln
Pr00ðwjÞ
Pr0ðwjÞ
 
6 lnmax
w
Pr0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ  lnminw
Pr0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ
 
þ lnmax
w
Pr00ðwÞ
Pr0ðwÞ  lnminw
Pr00ðwÞ
Pr0ðwÞ
 
¼ DðPr; Pr0Þ þ DðPr0; Pr00Þ: 
Proof of Theorem 2.2. If Pr and Pr 0 do not have the same support, we have
D(Pr,Pr 0) =1, and thus 1 = eD(Pr,Pr 0) 6 O 0(ajb)/O(ajb) 6 eD(Pr,Pr 0) =1. If they
have the same support, let rw = Pr
0(w)/Pr(w). The odds ratio O 0(ajb)/O(ajb) can be
expressed as
O0ðajbÞ
OðajbÞ ¼
Pr0ðajbÞ=Pr0ðajbÞ
PrðajbÞ=PrðajbÞ ¼
Pr0ða; bÞ=Pr0ða; bÞ
Prða; bÞ=Prða; bÞ
¼ ð
P
wa;bPr
0ðwÞÞ=ðPwa;bPr0ðwÞÞ
ðPwa;bPrðwÞÞ=ðPwa;bPrðwÞÞ
¼ ð
P
wa;brwPrðwÞÞ=ð
P
wa;brwPrðwÞÞ
ðPwa;bPrðwÞÞ=ðPwa;bPrðwÞÞ :
We now introduce maxwrw and minwrw to get the upper bound of the odds ratio
O0ðajbÞ
OðajbÞ 6
ððmaxwrwÞ
P
wa;bPrðwÞÞ=ððminwrwÞ
P
wa;bPrðwÞÞ
ðPwa;bPrðwÞÞ=ðPwa;bPr0ðwÞÞ ¼
maxwrw
minwrw
:
Similarly, we can also get the lower bound on the odds ratio:
O0ðajbÞ
OðajbÞ P
ððminwrwÞ
P
wa;bPrðwÞÞ=ððmaxwrwÞ
P
wa;bPrðwÞÞ
ðPwa;bPrðwÞÞ=ðPwa;bPr0ðwÞÞ ¼
minwrw
maxwrw
:
We note that the bounds can be expressed using our distance measure
eDðPr;Pr
0Þ ¼ maxwPr
0ðwÞ=PrðwÞ
minwPr0ðwÞ=PrðwÞ ¼
maxwrw
minwrw
;
eDðPr;Pr
0Þ ¼ minwPr
0ðwÞ=PrðwÞ
maxwPr0ðwÞ=PrðwÞ ¼
minwrw
maxwrw
:
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Therefore, we have eD(Pr,Pr
0) 6 O 0(ajb)/O(ajb) 6 eD(Pr,Pr 0). If both O 0(ajb) and
O(ajb) takes on either 0 or 1, the theorem still holds because 0=0¼def1 and
1=1¼def1.
The bound is tight in the sense that for every pair of distributions Pr and Pr 0,
there are events a = wi and b = wi or wj, where rwi = maxwrw and rwj = minwrw, such
that
O0ðajbÞ ¼
P
wa;brwPrðwÞP
wa;brwPrðwÞ
¼ rwiPrðwiÞ
rwjPrðwjÞ
:
Since O(ajb) = Pr(wi)/Pr(wj) and eD(Pr, Pr0) = (maxwrw)/(minwrw) = rwi /rwj, we have
O 0(ajb)/O(ajb) = eD(Pr,Pr0). Similarly, we can get O0ðajbÞ=OðajbÞ ¼ eDðPr;Pr0Þ. h
Proof of Theorem 3.1. To obtain the largest probability change for the conditional
event ajb given some KL-divergence, the new probability distribution Pr 0 needs to
satisfy the following three properties:
• For all w  a,b, Pr 0(w) = Pr(w) (Pr 0(ajb)/Pr(ajb)).
• For all w  a; b, Pr0ðwÞ ¼ PrðwÞðPr0ðajbÞ=PrðajbÞÞ.
• For all w  b, Pr 0(w) = Pr(w), i.e., Pr0ðbÞ ¼ PrðbÞ.
Under these three conditions, we have the following equality:
KLðPr; Pr0Þ ¼ Prða; bÞ ln Pr
0ða; bÞ
Prða; bÞ  Prða; bÞ ln
Pr0ða; bÞ
Prða; bÞ
¼ PrðbÞ PrðajbÞ ln Pr
0ðajbÞ
PrðajbÞ þ PrðajbÞ ln
Pr0ðajbÞ
PrðajbÞ
 
:
Since this is the case where we get the largest probability change, the following
inequality must be satisﬁed:
KLðPr; Pr0ÞP PrðbÞ PrðajbÞ ln Pr
0ðajbÞ
PrðajbÞ þ ð1 PrðajbÞÞ ln
1 Pr0ðajbÞ
1 PrðajbÞ
 
:
We can now plug in Pr 0(ajb) = O 0 (ajb)/(O 0(ajb) + 1) and Pr(ajb) = O(ajb)/
(O(ajb) + 1), and after simpliﬁcation, we get
KLðPr; Pr0ÞP PrðbÞ lnO
0ðajbÞ þ 1
OðajbÞ þ 1 
OðajbÞ
OðajbÞ þ 1 ln
O0ðajbÞ
OðajbÞ
 
: 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2.2, by replacing a,b with c1,
and a, b with c2. h
H. Chan, A. Darwiche / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 38 (2005) 149–174 167
Proof of Theorem 3.3. If c1, . . . , cn is a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
events, we have
X
i
PrðciÞ ln F Pr0 ;Prða : ciÞ ¼
X
i
PrðciÞ ln
Pr0ðaÞ=PrðaÞ
Pr0ðciÞ=PrðciÞ
¼
X
i
PrðciÞ ln
Pr0ðaÞ
PrðaÞ 
X
i
PrðciÞ ln
Pr0ðciÞ
PrðciÞ
¼ ln Pr
0ðaÞ
PrðaÞ
X
i
PrðciÞ 
X
i
PrðciÞ ln
Pr0ðciÞ
PrðciÞ
¼ ln Pr
0ðaÞ
PrðaÞ 
X
i
PrðciÞ ln
Pr0ðciÞ
PrðciÞ
:
We also note the following inequality about KL-divergence:
KLðPr; Pr0Þ ¼
X
w
PrðwÞ ln Pr
0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ P
X
i
PrðciÞ ln
Pr0ðciÞ
PrðciÞ
P 0:
Therefore, we have
ln
Pr0ðaÞ
PrðaÞ 6
X
i
PrðciÞ ln F Pr0 ;Prða : ciÞ 6 ln
Pr0ðaÞ
PrðaÞ þ KLðPr; Pr
0Þ;
or
0 6
X
i
PrðciÞ ln F Pr0 ;Prða : ciÞ  ln
Pr0ðaÞ
PrðaÞ 6 KLðPr; Pr
0Þ:
If instead of an arbitrary partition c1, . . . , cn, we are given the set of worlds w, then
we will get the following equality relation:X
w
PrðwÞ ln F Pr0;Prða : wÞ  ln Pr
0ðaÞ
PrðaÞ ¼ KLðPr; Pr
0Þ: 
Proof of Theorem 3.4. To prove this theorem, we ﬁrst establish two lemmas:
Lemma A.1. Given two distributions Pr and Pr 0, and a set of worlds S+, where
"w2S+Pr
0(w) > Pr(w), let rmax = maxw2S+(Pr
0(w)/Pr(w)). We have the following
inequality:
X
w2Sþ
PrðwÞ ln Pr
0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ 6 
Pr0ðSþÞ  PrðSþÞ
rmax  1 ln rmax: ðA:1Þ
Lemma A.2. Given two distributions Pr and Pr 0, and a set of worlds S, where
"w2SPr
0(w) < Pr(w), let rmin = minw2S(Pr
0(w)/Pr(w)). We have the following
inequality:
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X
w2S
PrðwÞ ln Pr
0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ 6 
Pr0ðSÞ  PrðSÞ
rmin  1 ln rmin: ðA:2Þ
We use induction to prove Lemma A.1. Lemma A.2 can be proved similarly.
Assume S = {w}, where Pr 0(w) > Pr(w). We have rmax = Pr 0(w)/Pr(w). Therefore:
PrðwÞ ln Pr
0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ ¼ 
rmaxPrðwÞ  PrðwÞ
rmax  1 ln rmax
¼  Pr
0ðwÞ  PrðwÞ
rmax  1 ln rmax:
Therefore, Inequality A.1 is satisﬁed for the set S.
Now we are given sets S1, . . . , Sn, where Si \ Sj = ; for all Si,Sj, i5 j, and "w2Si
Pr 0(w) > Pr(w) for all Si. Assume that Inequality A.1 is true for all Si, i.e. if
ri = maxw2Si(Pr
0(w)/Pr(w)), we have
X
w2Si
PrðwÞ ln Pr
0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ 6 
Pr0ðSiÞ  PrðSiÞ
ri  1 ln ri:
We want to prove that Inequality A.1 is also true for Sþ ¼
Sn
i¼1Si. First, we
note that if pP q > 1, we get (lnp)/(p  1)P (lnq)/(q  1). Now let rmax =
maxw2S+(Pr
0(w)/Pr(w)). Since rmaxP ri > 1 for all i, we have
X
w2Sþ
PrðwÞ ln Pr
0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ ¼
Xn
i¼1
X
w2Si
PrðwÞ ln Pr
0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ
6
Xn
i¼1
 Pr
0ðSiÞ  PrðSiÞ
ri  1 ln ri
6
Xn
i¼1
 Pr
0ðSiÞ  PrðSiÞ
rmax  1 ln rmax
¼ 
Pn
i¼1ðPr0ðSiÞ  PrðSiÞÞ
rmax  1 ln rmax
¼  Pr
0ðSþÞ  PrðSþÞ
rmax  1 ln rmax:
This proves that Inequality A.1 is also true for S+. Therefore, by induction,
Lemma A.1 is true.
We now proceed with the proof of Theorem 3.4. Given distributions Pr and Pr 0,
we divide all worlds into three subsets: S+, where "w2S+Pr
0(w) > Pr(w); S, where
"w2SPr
0(w) < Pr(w); and S0, where "w2S0Pr
0(w) = Pr(w). It is obvious that we must
have Pr 0(S+)  Pr(S+) = (Pr 0(S)  Pr(S)). If we are given rmax = maxw(Pr 0(w)/
Pr(w)) and rmin = minw(Pr
0(w)/Pr(w)), then the KL-divergence between Pr and Pr 0
is bounded by
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KLðPr; Pr0Þ ¼
X
w
 PrðwÞ ln Pr
0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ
¼
X
w2Sþ
 PrðwÞ ln Pr
0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ
þ
X
w2S
 PrðwÞ ln Pr
0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ
þ
X
w2S0
PrðwÞ ln Pr
0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ
6  Pr
0ðSþÞ  PrðSþÞ
rmax  1 ln rmax 
Pr0ðSÞ  PrðSÞ
rmin  1 ln rmin
¼ ðPr0ðSþÞ  PrðSþÞÞ ln rminrmin  1
ln rmax
rmax  1
 
:
We ﬁrst maximize Pr 0(S+)  Pr(S+) with respect to rmax and rmin. The constraints
we have are Pr 0(S+)/Pr(S+) 6 rmax, Pr 0(S)/Pr(S)P rmin, and Pr(S+) + Pr(S) =
Pr 0(S+) + Pr 0(S) 6 1. The solution we get is
Pr0ðSþÞ  PrðSþÞ 6 ðrmax  1Þð1 rminÞrmax  rmin :
Therefore
KLðPr; Pr0Þ 6 ðrmax  1Þð1 rminÞ
rmax  rmin
 
ln rmin
rmin  1
ln rmax
rmax  1
 
¼ ð1 rmaxÞ ln rmin  ð1 rminÞ ln rmax
rmax  rmin :
We now maximize this term with respect to d = ln rmax  ln rmin. The maximum
value is attained at rmax = e
dd/(ed  1) and rmin = d/(ed  1). The maximum KL-
divergence value is thus given by
KLðPr; Pr0Þ 6 ð1
ed d
ed1Þ ln ded1 ð1 ded1Þ ln e
d d
ed1
ed d
ed1 ded1
¼ ðe
d  1 eddÞ ln d
ed1 ðed  1 dÞðd þ ln ded1Þ
ðed  1Þd
¼ ðe
d  1Þd ln d
ed1 ðed  1 dÞd
ðed  1Þd
¼  ln d
ed  1
ed  1 d
ed  1
¼ 1 ln d
ed  1þ
d
ed  1 : 
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Proof of Theorem 4.1. We ﬁrst prove the following lemma.
Lemma A.3. Assume that we change parameter hxju to h
0
xju for every value x, and
Pr(u) > 0. For all xi where h
0
xiju > 0 or hxiju > 0, there must exist some w  xi, u such
that it satisfies the condition Pr0ðwÞ=PrðwÞ ¼ h0xiju=hxiju. For all other worlds w that do
not satisfy this condition, we must have Pr 0(w) = Pr(w), and thus Pr 0(w)/Pr(w) = 1. 5
First we note that Pr 0(u) = Pr(u) > 0. For any world w, either w  u, or w  xi, u
for some xi. We consider the diﬀerent cases of w.
• If w  u, we must have Pr 0(w) = Pr(w), because we are only changing parameters
hxju.
• If w  xi,u, we consider four cases of xi:
– If h0xi ju ¼ hxi ju ¼ 0, Pr 0(xi,u) = Pr(xi,u) = 0. Therefore, for all worlds w  xi,u,
Pr 0(w) = Pr(w) = 0.
– If h0xi ju ¼ 0 and hxi ju > 0, Pr 0(xi,u) = 0 and Pr(xi,u) > 0. Therefore, for all
worlds w  xi,u, either Pr 0(w) = Pr(w) = 0; or Pr 0(w) = 0 and Pr(w) > 0, giving
us Pr0ðwÞ=PrðwÞ ¼ 0 ¼ h0xiju=hxi ju. Moreover, because Pr(xi,u) > 0, there must
exist some w  xi,u such that Pr(w) > 0, and thus satisfying the condition
Pr0ðwÞ=PrðwÞ ¼ h0xiju=hxiju.
– If h0xiju > 0 and hxi ju ¼ 0, Pr 0(xi,u) > 0 and Pr(xi,u) = 0. Therefore, for all
worlds w  xi,u, either Pr 0(w) = Pr(w) = 0; or Pr 0(w) > 0 and Pr(w) = 0, giving
us Pr0ðwÞ=PrðwÞ ¼ 1 ¼ h0xi ju=hxiju. Moreover, because Pr 0(xi,u) > 0, there must
exist some w  xi,u such that Pr 0(w) > 0, and thus satisfying the condition
Pr0ðwÞ=PrðwÞ ¼ h0xiju=hxiju.
– If h0xiju > 0 and hxi ju > 0, Pr
0(xi,u) > 0 and Pr(xi,u) > 0. Therefore, for all
worlds w  xi,u, either Pr 0(w) = Pr(w) = 0; or Pr 0(w) > 0 and Pr(w) > 0,
giving us Pr0ðwÞ=PrðwÞ ¼ h0xiju=hxiju. Moreover, because Pr 0(xi,u) > 0 and
Pr(xi,u) = 0, there must exist some w  xi,u such that Pr 0(w) > 0 and
Pr(w) > 0, and thus satisfying the condition Pr0ðwÞ=PrðwÞ ¼ h0xi ju=hxi ju.
Therefore Lemma A.3 is correct, and we can conclude maxwðPr0ðwÞ=PrðwÞÞ ¼
maxxiðh0xiju=hxijuÞ and minwðPr0ðwÞ=PrðwÞÞ ¼ minxiðh0xiju=hxi juÞ. Consequently, we have
DðPr; Pr0Þ ¼ DðHX ;u;H0X ;uÞ. h
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let H0X ju be the distribution generated by the proportional
scheme, where h0xi ju ¼ ð1 h0xjuÞðhxi ju=ð1 hxjuÞÞ for all xi5 x, andH00X ju be an arbitrary
distribution with h00xju ¼ h0xju. We want to prove that DðHX ju;H00X juÞPDðHX ju;H0X juÞ.
• If hx—u = 1 and h00xju ¼ h0xju < 1, we must have DðHX ju;H00X juÞ ¼ 1. 6
5 Either Pr 0(w) = Pr(w) > 0; or Pr 0(w) = Pr(w) = 0, and thus Pr0ðwÞ=PrðwÞ ¼def 1.
6 Here, we will deﬁne the proportional scheme as making h0xi ju ¼ h0xj ju for all xi,xj5 x, since we have
0=0 ¼def 1.
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• If hxju = 0 and h00xju ¼ h0xju > 0, we must have both DðHX ju;H0X juÞ ¼ 1 and
DðHX ju;H00X juÞ ¼ 1.
• We now consider the case where hxju5 0 and hxju5 1. We ﬁrst assume
that h00xju ¼ h0xju > hxju. For H0X ju, we have maxxiðh0xi ju=hxi juÞ ¼ h0xju=hxju and
minxiðh0xi ju=hxi juÞ ¼ ð1 h0xjuÞ=ð1 hxjuÞ. IfHXju andH00X ju do not have the same sup-
port, we have DðHX ju;H00X juÞ ¼ 1P DðHX ju;H0X juÞ. If they have the same support,
we have the following inequality:
1 h00xju
1 hxju ¼
P
xi 6¼xh
00
xijuP
xi 6¼xhxiju
¼
P
xi 6¼xhxijuðh00xiju=hxi juÞP
xi 6¼xhxiju
P
P
xi 6¼xhxi juðmini ðh
00
xi ju=hxi juÞÞP
xi 6¼xhxiju
¼ min
i
h00xi ju
hxi ju
:
Thus for H00X ju, we have maxxiðh00xju=hxijuÞP h00xju=hxju ¼ h0xju=hxju ¼ maxxiðh0xi ju=hxi juÞ and
minxiðh00xiju=hxijuÞ 6 ð1 h00xjuÞ=ð1 hxjuÞ ¼ ð1 h0xjuÞ=ð1 hxjuÞ ¼ minxiðh0xi ju=hxi juÞ.
Therefore, we have
DðHX ju;H00X juÞ ¼ lnmaxxi
h00xiju
hxiju
 lnmin
xi
h00xiju
hxiju
P lnmax
xi
h0xi ju
hxi ju
 lnmin
xi
h0xi ju
hxi ju
¼ DðHX ju;H0X juÞ:
We can prove the above result for the similar case of h00xju ¼ h0xju < hxju.
Therefore, the proportional scheme gives us the smallest distance, and this
distance is equal to
DðHX ju;H0X juÞ ¼ ln
h0xju
hxju
 ln 1 h
0
xju
1 hxju


¼ ln h
0
xju
h0xju
 ln hxju
hxju

;
where hxju ¼ 1 hxju and h0xju ¼ 1 h0xju. h
Proof of Theorem 5.1. If p1, . . . , pn and q1, . . . , qn do not have the same support, we
can easily prove that the distributions Pr and Pr 0 also do not have the same support,
and thus D(Pr,Pr 0) = lnmaxi(qi/pi)  lnmini(qi/pi) =1. Otherwise, from Jeffreys
rule, we have Pr0ðwÞ ¼def PrðwÞðqi=piÞ, if w  ci. Therefore, we have Pr 0(w)/Pr(w) =
qi/pi, if w  ci. Consequently, we have:
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DðPr; Pr0Þ ¼ lnmax
w
Pr0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ  lnminw
Pr0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ
¼ lnmax
i
qi
pi
 lnmin
i
qi
pi
: 
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Let Pr 0 be the distribution generated by Jeffreys rule, while
Pr00 be any distribution that satisﬁes the constraint, Pr00(ci) = Pr 0(ci) = qi for all
i = 1, . . . , n. We want to prove that D(Pr,Pr00)P D(Pr,Pr 0).
If Pr and Pr00 do not have the same support, we have D(Pr,Pr00) =
1P D(Pr,Pr 0). If they have the same support, let qj/pj = maxi(qi/pi) and qk/
pk = mini(qi/pi). We now introduce rmax = maxw(Pr
00(w)/Pr(w)), and write the
following inequality:
rmaxpj ¼ rmaxPrðcjÞ ¼
X
wcj
rmaxPrðwÞ
P
X
wcj
Pr00ðwÞ
PrðwÞ PrðwÞ
¼
X
wcj
Pr00ðwÞ
¼ Pr00ðcjÞ ¼ qj:
This gives us rmaxP qj/pj. We can similarly introduce rmin = minw(Pr00(w)/Pr(w)),
and write the following inequality:
rminpk ¼ rminPrðckÞ ¼
X
wck
rminPrðwÞ
6
X
wck
Pr00ðwÞ
PrðwÞ PrðwÞ
¼
X
wck
Pr00ðwÞ ¼ Pr00ðckÞ ¼ qk:
This gives us rmin 6 qk/pk. Therefore, the distance between Pr and Pr00 is
DðPr; Pr00Þ ¼ lnmax
w
Pr00ðwÞ
PrðwÞ  lnminw
Pr00ðwÞ
PrðwÞ
¼ ln rmax  ln rmin P ln
qj
pj
 ln qk
pk
¼ lnmax
i
qi
pi
 lnmin
i
qi
pi
¼ DðPr; Pr0Þ:
Therefore, the distribution Pr 0 gives us the smallest distance. h
Proof of Theorem 5.3. From Pearls method of virtual evidence, we have
Pr0ðwÞ ¼def PrðwÞðki=ð
P
jpjkjÞÞ, if w  ci. Therefore, we have Pr0ðwÞ=PrðwÞ ¼
ki=ð
P
jpjkjÞ; if w  ci. Consequently, we have
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DðPr; Pr0Þ ¼ lnmax
w
Pr0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ  lnminw
Pr0ðwÞ
PrðwÞ
¼ lnmax
i
kiP
j
pjkj
 lnmin
i
kiP
j
pjkj
¼ lnmax
i
ki  lnmin
i
ki: 
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